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ILLEGAL ARREST AS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
TO MITIGATE A HOMICIDE
Legal provocation is a concession the law has made to the
frailty of man. Where a killing, although not justifiable nor ex-
cusable, is committed under such provocation as the law deems
sufficient to arouse in an ordinary reasonable man such great heat
of passion as would render him deaf to the voice of reason and if
such passion is in fact aroused, it is but manslaughter and not mur-
der.1 Thus, there are two prerequisites for mitigation: (1) legal
provocation, which is a question of law and (2) heat of passion,
which is a question of fact. It is with the first of these that we are
to be primarily concerned.
That an attempted illegal arrest constitutes such legal provo-
cation has been recognized since the childhood days of our law2
While the commentators have generally contented themselves with
the mere statement that an illegal arrest is a legal provocation,'
such has never been, and is certainly not today sufficient. The
problem calls for the resolution of two conflicting social interests-
on the one hand are the desirability and the necessity for uphold-
ing the dignity of the law and the resulting protection of society
and on the other is the cherished ideal of individual liberty and
freedom from oppression. With two such fundamental concepts at
war, compromise, which is never entirely satisfactory, is the only
solution. The Texas court well states the problem thus:
" here we approach a field of legal inquiry
which cannot well be styled terra mcognita in the law,
and yet, by reason of the embarrassments incident to a
protection of personal liberty, on the one hand, and the
due conservation of the officers of the law on the other,
it cannot be said that its limits are exactly defined, or
that further explorations are relieved altogether of dif-
ficulties."'
Changing social conditions have tipped and will continue to tip the
scales slightly in favor of one of the two interests involved. In the
past the political philosophy of absolutism and the distrust thereof
which survived it placed emphasis on the doctrine of human lib-
erty but today with the increasing comllexities of life and the
better realization of the fact that the individual in the interests of
the whole-of society must make repeated sacrifices, it may well be
1 1 Russell, Crimes 513-514 (3d ed. 1843)
2Tackett v. State, 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 392 (1832) Buckner's
Case, Style 467, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (1665), see, FOSTER, CROWN LAW
312 (2d ed. 1791)
3 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 233 (1803) FOSTER, CROWN LAv
312 (2d ed. 1791), 1 BIsHoP CRIIVINAL LAW sec. 868 (9th ed. 1923),
1 RUSSELL, CRIMES 580 (3d ed. 1843)
4 Alford v. State, 8 Tex. Cr. R. 545, 563 (1880).
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that the balance has shifted. Courts now serve to check the former
unrestrained power of rulers and grant relief and protection in the
event that personal liberty is violated.
"Hence the necessity can scarcely ever arise
for the citizen to take the law in his own hands, and
by a kind of rude primitive justice, belonging to a
past age, protect his personal liberty from such in-
vasion as he may consider unlawful.
"It is better that personal liberty should be regu-
lated by law and that law executed and submitted to
in the light of civilization, and with the concessions,
which every citizen is bound to make for the good of
all, than to have the vicious take advantage of de-
fects of procedure and shoot down the civil offi-
cers of the land. M;
A review of the cases, considering the interests involved and
the question as to which is the more deserving of the protection of
modern society, is essential to determine what, if any, restrictions
have been imposed on the broadly stated rule of the common law.
Numerous decisions are but repetitions of the common law
rule-if the arrest was illegal, the offense was manslaughter.' While
in most of these cases the question of malice was not involved,
there is language to the effect that the offense can in no instance
be greater than manslaughter if the officer was proceeding with-
out authority. The Mississippi court in its decision of Williams v.
State' held that the applicable statute made the offense man-
slaughter even though malice was present if such malice did not
exist prior to the unlawful arrest. Also adopting the same view is
the language of the Massachusetts court:
although in many cases the act might be
done under such circumstances of deliberate cruelty as
would equal or surpass, in point of atrocity and moral
turpitude,, many cases recognized as murder; yet the
prisoner must be tried by the rules of law, and not by
the aggravation of the offense, as tried and tested by
another and different standard."'
Such views ignore the second prerequisite of mitigation as set forth
supra, and while the primary concern of this note is with what con-
stitutes legal provocation, the obvious danger of a purely objective
standard calls for comment. It is to-be remembered that the rationale
of all instances where there is said to be provocation sufficient to
•Alsop v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky L. Rep. 547, 552-553 (1882)
'Plemmons v. State, 43 Ga. App. 344, 158 S.E. 630 (1931) Com-
monwealth v. Carey 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 246 (1853), People v Burt,
51 Mich. 199, 16 N.W 378 (1883) Williams v State, 122 Miss. 151,
84 So. 8 (1919), Poteete v. State, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 261 (1878) Rex
v. Addes, 6 C. & P 388, 172 Eng. Rep. 1289 (1834)
122 Miss. 151, 84 So. 8 (1919)
S Commonwealth v Carey 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 246, 251 (1853).
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mitigate the homicide from murder to manslaughter is that such
provocation ordinarily arouses such heat of passion as to render the
inflamed mind blind to reason. These cases where the provocation
is an illegal arrest should constitute no exception.
Other courts state the rule as above with the additional require-
ment that there be an absence of express malice.' If it is to be under-
stood that the courts in the first category, with the possible excep-
tion of the Mississippi and Massachusetts courts, imply a subjective
standard, then there is no difference between the two positions.
Certainly a subjective standard is required unless an exception to
the general law of mitigation is to be created. But even a rule with
an express stipulation against the presence of malice will not suffice.
Although it is conceded to be the view of most of the courts, it is
'felt that such a rule is far too lenient. It is the opinion of the author
that the law should not concede as a matter of law that heat of
passion is aroused in the ordinary reasonable man by mere illegal-
ity of arrest and an absence of express malice.
That such a view is not that of the author alone is attested by
the attempts of some courts to place limitations of varying degrees
'upon the rule. The early decision is Mackalley's Case" distinguished
between cases where the warrant was illegal and where the process
was merely erroneous. Such a distinction is valid; for does it not
stand to reason that where but for a mere error in process the ar-
rest would be valid, the knowledge of such minor infirmity could
not produce the inflamed passion required for mitigation? Another
limitation which should be expressly included in the rule is that the
killing must be committed in resistance to the illegal arrest and must
be essential to the escape of the prisoner.' In People v. Gilman," the
officer permitted the defendant to go inside while the officer awaited
without. Rather than fleeing, or at least remaining within if it is
not required that a man flee from his own home, the defendant
armed himself and came out shooting. Obviously such killing was
committed in revenge rather than under the sway of passion and is
murder. A similar situation was presented in Regina v. Sattler"
where the deceased, an officer, was returning the illegally arrested
defendant to England by boat, from which he could not escape. The
killing of the officer by the defendant under such circumstances
was held to be murder. Unquestionably such a limitation is proper,
for if an illegally arrested person may secure his liberty without
'State v Ward, 5 Har. (Del.) 496 (1854) Roberson v. State, 43
Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (1901), People v White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168
(1929) State v Burnett, - Mo. - 188 S.W 2d 51 (1945) State v
Kuykendall, 37 N.M. 135, 19 P 2d 744 (1933) Moore v Common-
wealth, 86 Va. 443, 10 S.E. 534 (1890)
"09 Co. Rep. 61b., 77 Eng. Rep. 824 (1611)
"Napper v State, 200 Ga. 626, 38 S.E. 2d 269 (1946) Briggs v
Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554 (1886)
1"47 Cal. App. 118, 190 Pac. 205 (1920)
"Dears. & B. 539, 169 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1858).
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resorting to the extreme of killing but still kills, such is done in a
spirit of revenge rather than a spirit of passion. It is a punitive act
and the law does not and cannot permit a man to be the judge of
his own cause.
In Ex Parte Sherwood" it was held that where the illegality of
the arrest was unknown to the defendant, it could arouse no provoca-
tion in him and the slaying would be murder. Since the law refuses
to mitigate where the arrest is lawful, it should do likewise where
the illegality is unknown. The law requires that citizens submit to
lawful arrest, as indeed it must do or decree its destruction, and
mitigates only for the passion aroused by the unlawful restraint of
personal liberty If the defendant believed that the arrest was law-
ful, he should not be permitted to claim that he was inflamed there-
by, upon subsequently learning of its illegal character. While the
early English case of The Queen v. Tooley" held that ignorance of
the illegality was no bar to mitigation, the decision therein has been
severely criticized. 6 An identical problem is presented where the
defendant is unaware that an attempt is being made to arrest him.
In the absence of other mitigating factors this must be murder for
no provocation could arise from an unknown attempt to illegally
arrest, and it has so been held.17
In addition to the decisions considered which attempt to place
limitations on the general rule, there is a Nebraska case the lan-
guage of which indicates that if the victim of an illegal arrest is
driven to the alternative of submission or homicide, he may adopt
the latter course with impunity.' However, such a view contains so
little merit as to render it unnecessary to discuss it. A few other
cases show a reluctance on the part of the courts to mitigate under
any circumstances," but it is felt that the language used was broader
than the facts presented and that the writers of the opinions were
unaware of any intimation that illegal arrest could not constiute
provocation.
In the above discussion no mention has been made of the guilt
of the party sought to be arrested. It is hoped that such has been
noted with surprise by the reader, for it is felt by the author that
"29 Tex. App. 334, 15 S.W 812 (1890).
"2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (1709)
"FOsTER, CROWN LAW 312-316 (2d ed. 1791).
"State v. Middletown, 26 N.M. 353, 192 Pac. 483 (1920)
"Simmerman v. State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 N.W 115 (1883) see
1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW sec. 541 (11th ed. 1912). (In footnote 6 of
such section, the Nebraska case is miscited and reference was ob-
viously to the Simmerman case. While the Delaware case sustains
the point made, the Texas cases belong in the self defense category.)
"People v Bradley, 23 Cal. App. 44, 136 Pac. 955 (1913) (But
see the subsequent case, People v. Gilman, supra, note 12) Noles v.
State, 26 Ala. 31 (1885). (But in the later case of Sanders v State,
181 Ala. 35, - 61 So. 336, 340 (1913), the Noles case is cited for the
proposition that if excessive force is used in resisting, it is murder)
see Alsop v Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547, 551-553 (1882)
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the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the charge for which the
arrest is sought to be made is the most important factor m determin-
ing whether a reasonable man would have been legally provoked.
The question of whether a guiltless conscience should be a require-
ment of legal provocation in the case of an unlawful arrest has re-
ceived but scant attention from the courts. In the case of People v.
Burt,"' it was held that proof of guilt of the defendant of the crime
for which the deceased was attempting to arrest him was improper.
And the Washington court has held that an offer by the defendant
of proof of innocence of the offense for which he was being arrested
was properly rejected.2 1 However in the latter case the arrest was
legal, so there could be no mitigation in any event. While it may
be true, as the Georgia court states, that, "Every man, however
guilty has a right to shun an illegal arrest by flight,"-- the mere
fact of illegality alone and the right of flight is not so impelling as
to require that the law decree that the situation is one from which
heat of passion might arise. The dicta of the Pennsylvania court in
its decision of Brooks and Orme v. Commonwealth" contain the only
extended discussion of the question. The court therein states:
"An innocent man is unconscious of guilt, and may
stand on his own defense. When assailed under a pre-
tence which is false his natural passion arises, and he
turns upon his assailant with indignation and anger.
To be arrested without cause is to the innocent great
provocation. If in the frenzy of passion he loses his self-
control and kills his assailant, the law so far regards
his infirmity that it acquits him of malicious hoicide.
But this is not the condition of the felon. Conscious of
his crime, he has no just provocation-he knows his
violation of law, and that duty demands his capture.
Neither reason nor law accords to him that sense of
outrage which springs into a mind unconscious of of-
fence, and makes it stand in defense of personal lib-
e r ty " -29
Such logic is irresistible. A person who has violated the law should
anticipate that an attempt will be made to bring him to justice. If
a person is anticipating apprehensicn it should not be said that mere
illegality in the apprehension, in the absence of an assault and bat-
tery or other recognized provocation, would give rise to such heat of
passion as would mitigate. An analogous situation could arise where
a fugitive is attempted to be apprehended. ' Although the officer is
unaware that the person is a fugitive from justice and is arresting
without authority on a different charge, the fugitive should be an-
ticipating an attempt to arrest him and if he kills to resist the arrest
51 Mich. 199, 16 N.W 378 (1883)
"State v Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 Pac. 626 (1899).
"2Thomas v State, 91 Ga. 204, -, 18 S.E. 305 (1892)
"61 Pa. 352 (1869)
"Id. at 360.
'Williford v State, 121 Ga. 176, 48 S.E. 962 (1904)
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS 321
it should be murder. Where a person who has not a guiltless con-
science is attempted to be arrested and resists, it is difficult to see
how a reasonable man could find that the killing was not committed
from fear of being brought to justice rather than passion.
In summary it may be stated that the general rule is that if
there is an illegal arrest, the killing of the officer will be no more
than manslaughter in the absence of express malice, although this
limitation may not be expressly stated. However, in view of the
needs of present day society, it is believed that the person temporar-
ily deprived of his liberty should submit and avail himself of his
legal right of redress. It is submitted that the following require-
ments for mitigation in the case of illegal arrest do no violence to
either established legal thought or the public policies involved:
(1) the arrest must in fact be illegal,
(2) the defendant must have knowledge of the illegality of the
arrest,
(3) the killing must be done in and must be necessary to the
resistance of the illegal arrest,
(4) the defendant must have a guiltless conscience, and
(5) heat of passion must in fact exist in the defendant.
In addition to the restrictions placed on the availability of provo-
cation in the case of an illegal arrest, a reformation of the law en-
forcing system is required. There is a crying need for better person-
nel in law enforcing agencies in this country and they should be
adequately instructed as to the extent of their authority and as to
the rights of private persons. Furthermore, they should be held to a
strict accountability for acts done in excess of their authority It is
an unfortunate fact that officers of the law, drunk either with power
or from fear, frequently maltreat the public. Equally unfortunate is
the fact that "blue-ribbon" juries from a sense of obligation for the
protection afforded their property almost invariably vindicate the
officer if the case ever reaches the court. Judges and jurors, as well
as police officers, should be impressed with the fact that unlawful
enforcement of the law merits contempt rather than respect. Ad-
mittedly the conclusions herein advanced are not a panacea; none
is possible. But it is thought that they afford the maximum protec-
tion to each of the public interests involved in view of the needs of
modern society.
JOHN J. HOPKINS
